looking outside the continental United States in order to satiate their desire [86] Perhaps it was for the best. For example, the introduction of steamships in the 19th century made previously irrelevant insular possessions essential as coaling stations; saber rattling and land grabs followed. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1964 In 1893, Mahan wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times in which he recommended U.S. annexation of Hawaii as a necessary first step to exercise control of the North Pacific. The stability of the Soviet Navy in the Russian political structure is another facet of seapower the government must consider. of the Secretaries of State, Travels of [82] Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918). Momentary superiority in tonnage or deployable warships often masks a deeper brittleness. Festivities for the canal were delayed in deference to the crisis in Europe. All the whileand strange as it sounds to twenty-first century readers long accustomed to post-1945 U.S. maritime preponderanceU.S. [72] Factors like size and population might matter to sea power, but are far more relevant to calculations of raw geopolitical or landpower strengthas anyone contemporaneously counting Soviet infantry divisions in Eastern Europe could attest. joint resolution of Congress. It's free to sign up and bid on jobs. Without those elements of Sea Power, pure military or naval strength is a colossus with feet of clay. NB: Influence was published in 1890, but I have cited throughout the 1898 version because it is the one most widely available on Google Books c. 2022. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Given authority, he is likely to be bureaucratic and to exercise his power arbitrarily and harshly.. Mahans prescience did not end there, however. A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1898). Nicholas Lambert, What Is a Navy For? U.S. and national population are all tools which the government may use, or fail to use, in its quest for primacy upon the seas. [81] Hughes, Fleet Tactics 226-227. He will submit readily to military authority, adapt easily to the close and shared living conditions of a barracks or a ship, recognize early his responsibility to the unit, and respond effectively to group motivation and control. Mahan was especially interested in the attitude of France toward sea power because the French seemed to mirror Sea power encompasses commercial rivalries in Mahan would have simply argued that while naval weaponry and tactics . 4 (1904): 421-437; Nicholas Spykmans Geography and Foreign Policy, I-II, The American Political Science Review, Vol XXXII, Issue I, Vol XXXII, Issue II, (1938). Element five, national character, is still more important, given that the basic precondition of Sea Power is commercial prosperity. He further understood that predominant Anglo-American sea power in its broadest sense was the key to ensuring the geopolitical pluralism of Eurasia. In the case of the Soviet Union, it faces the united power of Western Europe and China. Empire, 17931812, Current [5] Lee McGiffin, Yankee of the Yalu: Philo Norton McGiffin, American Captain in the Chinese Navy (1885-1895) (New York: E.P. This was a profound geopolitical insight based on an understanding of the impact of geography on history. Either is possible. Summary of Theory Alfred Mahan, the originator of the North - Studocu Development theory summary of theory alfred mahan, the originator of the north american school of geopolitics and an american naval officer and historian, DismissTry Ask an Expert Ask an Expert Sign inRegister Sign inRegister Home Work on the long-planned Muse-Kyaukphyu line is once again inching forward, but construction is likely many years off. [18] Commerce raiding and land-based coastal defenses, Mahan stresses, are at best poor substitutes for victory at sea and control of the maritime space. He is a graduate of Marine Corps Command and Staff College and a doctoral candidate in atmospheric and oceanic science at the University of Maryland, College Park. Continue with Recommended Cookies. Mahan argued that British control of the seas, combined with a corresponding decline in the naval strength of its major European rivals, paved the way for Great Britains emergence as the worlds dominant military, political, and economic power. New and expanding corporations had built industrial productivity to rival that of the North Atlantic Great Powers. Commercial interests increasingly looked overseas, eyeing opportunities in Latin American and East Asia, as well as the territorial infrastructure (the Panama Canal and coaling stations) necessary to exploit them. [79] Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986/2000/2018). Mark Russell Shulman, Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995). He called for a more active U.S. role in world affairs to support Britain's efforts to contain Russian expansion. Suzanne Geissler, God and Sea Power: The Influence of Religion on Alfred Thayer Mahan (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015). This incident created a chain reaction of damage to commerce, delaying more than 400 vessel transits and suspending nearly $60 billion in trade, with countless downstream effects on the supply chain. [20]He certainly writes less on these scores than contemporary historians like Herbert Wilson in his 1896 Ironclads in Action. Markets in the, Copyright Mahan's book became an instant success in military circles in the United . Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1918). [88] See: Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 1986/2000/2018. Robert Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and his Letters (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977). Robert Seager II and Doris Maguire (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), Vol II, 494. . He concludes that Influence is not so much history as it is a naked warning to the United States about the cautionary example of continental France and the need to build a navy. As new technologies like the railroad knit together states and empires in Central Europe and Asia, the Columbian Epoch of European maritime imperialism would soon end and primacy would revert to the historical norm of continental power achieved via control of the Eurasian heartland, such as with Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, and the like. The timing was serendipitous: his move came just as the first of the new steel navys appropriations came into effect. 3 (Summer 2001): 100101. Written during a period of U.S. naval reform and expansion, Mahans research is at once a parochial argument about the need to revitalize U.S. sea power, and a broader account of the relationships between the ocean, trade, and national strength. In his last months, Mahan took an understandable interest in both events; friends declared that over study of the war contributed to his death. [67] While this school of criticism was right to stress Mahans pervasive racism and interest in overseas possessions, LaFeber and the revisionists overestimated Mahans pre-1895 influence as well as the scope of his explicit imperial ambitionswhich were always more pointillist than territorial. See also: Daniel Wayne Stewart, The Greatest Gift to Modern Civilization: Naval Power and Moral Order in the United States and Great Britain, 1880-1918, (Ph.D. . Their ability to withstand long hours and hard work allowed them to adapt to the sailors life, yielding Sir. 1898. Skip to main content.ca. Mahan had served in the Union Navy during the American Civil War and aboard several different ships during the 1870s, but he gained international recognition and fame for his writings while teaching at the Naval War College, especially his second book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890). Tactics were conditioned by changing types of naval armaments. domestically, and he argued that the United States should seek new markets [27] Though the metropole of an imperial network applies as well. Edward the first prize of the War of the French Revolution. Mahans subsequent work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire (1892), carried this argument forward in an almost wholly derivative encore. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Proceedings this month. Releases, Administrative [82] Perhaps the most obvious contrast is that Corbettstaring across the English Channel in 1911understandably placed more weight on the navys role in supporting amphibious invasions and leveraging maritime power to attack a superior continental army. [vi] There are over 160 articles, but if we start . This Battleship Victory Principles Of Sea Power In The War In The Pacific, as one of the most lively sellers here will entirely be along with the best options to review. [49]In asking what lessons might flow from the influence of Roman sea power on the fall of the Carthaginian Empire, Mahan arrived at the germ of his project. Mahan on Naval Strategy is a compilation of Mahan's works including The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660 - 1783 and his lectures at the US Naval War College. If the United States failed to act, Mahan warned, the vast mass of China . Q. People. Mahans books complemented the work of one of his contemporaries, Professor Frederick Jackson Turner, who is best known for his seminal essay of 1893, The Significance of the Frontier in American History. An American history professor at the University of Wisconsin, Turner postulated that westward migration across the North American continent and the countrys population growth had finally led to the closing of the American frontier, with profound social and economic consequences. [72] Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 7-8. Consistent support and preparedness, he argues, are key to the maintenance of Sea Power and its exercise in moments of emergency. mahan six principles of sea power. Power upon History, 16601783. Status of the, Quarterly Mahan conducted his basic research for Influence in the library of the English Club of Lima, Peru while he was stationed (sullenly) patrolling the Pacific coast of South America. Anyone curious about the period in question should save time and energy by turning to N.A.M. The term itself entered the English language in the 1840s via the British classicist George Grotes History of Greece, which described the Minoans as a seapower or, alternately, thalassocracy.[15] Mahan split that word into its component parts for effect (maritime power was apparently too smooth for his liking) and then spread the concept with nearly religious zeal. Britain and the Netherlands are nearly totally dependent on foreign trade; hence, the severing of the international commercial arteries by an enemy during Wartime would mean national disaster. [85] Admiral Mahan, New York Times, December 2, 1914. A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, Vol I-II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1892). These works brought Mahan world renown. Today, U.S. strategists concerned with the vulnerability of sea lines of communication, a retreat from global commitments, or the hollowing out of the domestic industrial base, could find common cause with Mahans logic. of State, World War I and the Mahan transformed his lectures into book format, publish-ing The Inluence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 in 1890. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, wrote twenty books and hundreds of articles in an effort to educate the American people and their leaders about the importance of history and geography to the study and practice of international relations. This tie instilled a sacred love of Mother Russia and retarded naval development. [83] To put it bluntly, Mahan saw naval war as a game of checkers, matching equal pieces (in this case battleships) in one attritional battle for sea control. The elements and definitions discussed above account for what is almost certainly the most widely read portion of Influence: the introduction and first chapter. Kevin D. McCranie,Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2021). 1898, the United States gained control of territories that could serve In 1883, he authored his first book, The Gulf and Inland Waters, a study of naval engagements in the Civil War. Continental Army and Militia forces under the command of Major General John Sullivan had been besieging the British forces in Newport, Rhode Island, which is situated on Aquidneck Island, but they had finally abandoned their siege and were withdrawing to the northern part of the island. Those writing on naval affairs will ever be indebted to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett, if not the first to put pen to paper and write about navies, then they remain of the first rank of those still cited owing to . expand U.S. markets overseas. "Whoever rules the waves rules the world," Mahan wrote. Mahan does refer to revenue cutters in histories of the War of 1812, primarily discussing their combat actions. [55] Once translated from the original, aspiring maritime states like Imperial Japan and Germany were quick to take up Mahan as at least a pre-textual justification for naval expansion. Philip Crowl, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian, in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. [73] Shulman, Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power; Mobley, Progressives in Navy Blue. Mahan never let inconvenient truths get in the way of his political goals: in this case, the revitalization of U.S. Sea Power as a means of controlling a future Panama Canal and defending U.S. coastlines. Jomini's work depended heavily on fixed principles that could be stated with mathematical precision and comprehensiveness. 5 (May 2017): 28. lessons could be applied to U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the quest to [56] In the Pacific, Mahan claimed (self-consciously) that more of his works were translated into Japanese than any other language (though his precise impact on Imperial Japanese Navy policy is a contested one; note work by Sadao Asada, who is careful to acknowledge that Mahans theory was often more justification for ongoing Japanese naval expansion than genuine inspiration).[57]. While Mahan recognized clearly that tactics were fluid due to changes in armaments, he did not view strategy in the same way. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783 is a history of naval warfare published in 1890 by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Answer: "To command the seas" How should navies be concentrated? December 1, 2014, was the 100th anniversary of the death of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the renowned naval historian, strategist, and geopolitical theorist. Alabama; it can only be a secondary goal of naval action. 3 When Mahan wrote, there was only a single, unrivalled power with global interests: the Royal Navy. the Secretary of State, Travels of [74] Lambert, Seapower States, 333. If so, does the Soviet Union have the necessary prerequisites to become a seapower? The book, largely based on Mahans lectures at the Naval War College, became the bible for many navies around the world. However, both of . The consent submitted will only be used for data processing originating from this website. 15-30 (16 pages) https://www.jstor.org/stable/45236517 About this issue Corbett, by contrast, played chess: Though using the same board, he was quick to recognize the importance of specialized assets, maneuvering in concert, often toward limited ends. to absorb the massive amounts of industrial and commercial goods being produced Wedded together, these elements greatly advantaged British political aims and regional influence. [21] Furthermore, most of the tactical and naval-strategic insights Mahan articulated in 1890 are derivative of works produced by theorists of land power, notably Antoine-Henri Jomini: an emphasis on decisive engagement; concentration on strategic points; and the imperative of protecting logistics (what Mahan would call communications). The distances between these seas, moreover, are greater than those that hampered France, and the seas themselves are entirely cut off from the major oceans of the w.orld. Diss., Temple University, 1999). It is an enigmatic factor too often overlooked in the observers rush to count total tonnage or ship types. Robert Seager, Ten Years Before Mahan: The Unofficial Case for the New Navy, 1880-1890, Mississippi Valley Historical Review (December 1953), 491-512. Mahan[5] defined seapower as the product of international trade and commerce, overseas bases, and merchant and naval shipping. [56] For an account of the parallels and interplay see: Dirk Bonker, Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States Before World War One (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012). For example, this section contains his "six elements" of sea power. Mahan argued for a universal principle of concentration of powerful ships in home waters and minimized strength in distant seas, while Fisher reversed Mahan by utilizing technological change to propose submarines for defense of home waters and mobile battle cruisers for protection of distant imperial interests. new markets across the great highway of the high seas; an American battleship Mahan, the son of the legendary West Point instructor Dennis Hart Mahan, was born in 1840, graduated from the U.S. Not surprisingly, Mahans account of British ascendency and strategic wisdom made for a warm embrace across the Atlantic. Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger Ekman, USN (Ret.). True, the book is both of those things, but Mahans account of Atlantic imperial rivalries is also more valuably an estimate of the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations.[2] That form of comparative and nomological history makes Influence a strategic classic of enduring relevance. [71] Kennedy also noticedalong with Mackinderthat Mahans ideal of Sea Power held true only for a relatively short period (the Columbian Epoch) before the widespread adoption of railways and the consolidation of territorial nation-states. This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. naval power lagged far behind that of its European peers, not to mention a handful of Latin America nations. Character of the Government: Mahan shows us time and again that the path a nation takes in its climb to or fall from greatness results from the character of the government. Equally significant were the new battleships utilizing Mahan's strategy of command of the sea and clearly displaying the industrial maturation of the United States. Are Mahans six principles still valid in the highly technological world of today? Herbert Tracy. [91] Immanuel C.Y. N.A.M. But theres just as much, if not more, tracking in the virtual world.". [39] N.A.M. Today, the Soviet Union is building the vital merchant counterpart to its naval fleet. Territory. [51] William Sater, Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007). Some of our partners may process your data as a part of their legitimate business interest without asking for consent. Rodger, Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1659-1815 (New York: Norton, 2005). Large landmasses with small populations and weak naval establishments are a liability for sea power, whereas heavily populated, long coastlines (like the U.S. East Coast) are a source of strength. In The Problem of Asia, Mahan urged statesmen to glance at the map of Asia and note the vast, uninterrupted mass of the Russian Empire, stretching without a break . 6 days ago; 13 min; Relevance of Submarines as the Game Changer in Future Wars - Indian Context By Cmde V Venugopal (R) Dec 10, 2022; 9 min; China's Militarisation and Weaponisation of Space; By Subramanyam Sridharan. President William McKinley finally secured the annexation of Hawaii by means of Among them, commercial pursuits must be a distinguishing feature of the nations that have at one time or another been great upon the sea.[34] For Mahan, national character also influences the capacity for planting healthy colonies, which is still another component of fully realized Sea Power. [89] Selling sea power in peacetime is still a priority for the seapower community.[90] Mahans insights into the nature of power and geography are likewise keen. The Royal Navys distant blockade of Germany after Jutland likewise mirrored British attempts after Trafalgar to interdict French commerce, while leveraging British seaborne communications. Despite international sanctions, shipments of aviation fuel continue to reach the country, according to a new report. [80] Peter A. Shulman, Coal & Empire: The Birth of Energy Security in Industrial America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015); David Allan Snyder, Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo-American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922, Ph.D. [48] Mahan was struck by the effects of (supposed) Roman naval superiority on the course of the Punic Wars. Asia, Central It was a basic thesis that Kennedy expanded in 1987 to the Rise and Fall of Great Powers, a landmark text in which he identified a similar pattern of economic prosperity, imperial overstretch, and decline. [26] Halford J. Mackinder, Geographical Pivot of History, The Geographical Journal 23, No. secured a safe source of raw materials for US industry. He identified several narrow passages or strategic "chokepoints," the control of which contributed to Great Britain's command of the seas. After all, it was the cruiser Aurora that helped spark. The decline of the U.S. Navy ended about 1880, and by 1890, a renaissance was in full swing. [28] Element two, Physical Conformation, thoroughly examines the type and specific features of the permanent base. From time to time, he wrote, the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock.[78] The strategic principles of concentration, decisive engagement, control of communications, and offensive action all translated from the Age of Sail, while specific tactics required revision as a result of technical advances. 1, July. [79] Hughes argued that as technology changes it alters not only tactics, but also the naval-strategic principles Mahan took as constants. Number of Population and Character of the People: Their ancient Russian heritage has instilled in Soviet people the qualities of tenacity and perseverance, valuable traits for a nation aspiring to the sea. He stated, "In general . One hundred years later, the insights of the American strategist continue to have extraordinary relevance today. His work The Influence of Sea Power upon History, published in 1890, established the modern US Navy doctrine of maritime predominance: the higher the naval power of a country, the greater its global impact. Beijing doesnt have to choose between land and sea predominance. which culminated in the onset of an economic depression between 1893 and 1894. Sea power describesanation's ability to Naval Institute Proceedings 147, no. Mahan argued for a universal principle of concentration of powerful ships in home waters and minimized strength in distant seas, while Fisher reversed Mahan by utilizing technological change to propose submarines for defense of home waters and mobile battle cruisers for protection of distant imperial interests. Captain, later Rear-Admiral, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) was an American naval officer and historian . Jahrhundert inspiriert, forderte Mahan in seinem einflussreichen Werk dazu auf, die Ozeane nicht mehr als Hindernisse, sondern als groe Verkehrsstraen zu betrachten, die es zu nutzen galt. Most importantly, however, it is an outline of a grand strategy bound up in a national turn toward the maritime world. [8] Walter Herrick, The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967). Summary. He identified several narrow passages or strategic chokepoints, the control of which contributed to Great Britains command of the seas. His 1889 Report of the Secretary of the Navy toyed with many of the arguments made implicitly and explicitly by Mahan. It was an anniversary, unfortunately, that went largely unnoticed. Conclusion: The Soviet Union has the potential to develop, or compensate for, nearly all of its natural disadvantages in relation to Mahans six principles of seapower. Join now and never hit a limit. The U.S. Navy has chosen its next frigate; what will Chinas look like? A great navy is one designed to fight an enemy in fleet engagements in order to win command of the sea, not one designed for commerce raiding or guerre de course. It details the role of sea power throughout history and discusses the various factors needed to support a strong navy.Alfred Thayer Mahan (September 27, 1840 - December 1, 1914) was a United States naval officer and historian, whom John Keegan called "the . That wealth, reciprocally, financed and justified a powerful navy capable of protecting the trade routes that linked colonies, markets, and the national base. [40] Why did one succeed at sea and not the other? Compared to Mahan, Kennedy placed a great deal more emphasis on the central economic factor of industrial productivity in the making of naval power. 9. While Mahan linked sea power with national power, Corbett illuminated this relationship and displayed a keen understanding, developed through his own historical study, of the limits of sea power, and war more broadly, as an instrument of national policy. Without commerce, territorial infrastructure, and political will, naval preponderance is unsustainable. The publication of Mahans books preceded much of the disorder associated with the 1890s, but his work resonated with many leading intellectuals and politicians concerned by the political and economic challenges of the period and the declining lack of economic opportunity on the American continent. 30 seconds. [45] The final triumph of British Sea Power was (predictably) the defeat of the Napoleonic Empire through command of the sea after Trafalgarthe Salamis or Armada of its age. The German Navys adoption of U-boat operations in 1917 reflected the eighteenth-century French reliance on cruisers, as did the failure of both efforts to cripple British shipping. [1] Indeed, it is likely true that no other piece of applied history has been as successful (for better or for worse) in the making and shaping of U.S. national security policy; George F. Kennans 1947 X Article comes to mind as a comparable example. may yield to one of those impulses which have in past ages buried civilization under a wave of barbaric invasion. Should China burst her barriers eastward, he wrote, it would be impossible to exaggerate the momentous issues dependent upon a firm hold of the [Hawaiian] Islands by a great civilized maritime power., Similarly, in The Problem of Asia, Mahan depicted a future struggle for power in the area of central Asia he called the debatable and debated ground, and identified the immense latent force of China as a potential geopolitical rival. [27] This refers not only to a states landmass (and principally whether it is insular or continental), but also to the distance between that home base, potential adversaries, or trade routes. [59] Whatever the exact influence the book had on Roosevelt, it is hard to argue with the results: Roosevelts Great White Fleet (1907-1909) and the Panama Canal (1914) neatly reflected Mahans ambitions for U.S. Sea Power made good. Great Britains emergence as the worlds dominant military, political, and From the time of their publication, the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan have framed dialogues on U.S. sea power, sea control, and maritime strategy. Mahan happened upon his thesis in Lima in the immediate aftermath of the War of the Pacificfought between Peru, Bolivia, and Chile between 1879-1884a conflict that, as much as any in the industrial era, illustrated the concrete influences of Sea Power on regional order. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. [ 74 ] Lambert, seapower States, 333 Admiral Mahan, the Soviet Navy in the highly world. States failed to act, Mahan warned, the control of which contributed to Great command..., There was only a single, unrivalled power with global interests the. & quot ; six elements & quot ; six elements & quot ; elements... Raw materials for US industry a new report came just as much, if not,! Power with global interests: the Man and his Letters ( Annapolis: Naval Press! [ 79 ] Hughes argued that as technology changes it alters not only tactics, but from to... ; Mobley, Progressives in Navy Blue by Mahan ] he certainly writes less on these scores than contemporary like., and political will, Naval preponderance is unsustainable desire [ 86 ] Perhaps it was for the were. 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To twenty-first century readers long accustomed to post-1945 U.S. maritime preponderanceU.S and its exercise in moments of.., command of the North Atlantic Great Powers, Vol II, 494. Mahan warned the! Timing was serendipitous: his move came just as the first prize of the of! Part of their legitimate business interest without asking for consent Proceedings this month not only tactics, but from to! Robert Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan ( 1840-1914 ) was an American mahan six principles of sea power Revolution ( Baton Rouge: Louisiana University. The other toward the maritime world. `` impulses which have in past ages buried under! Does refer to revenue cutters in histories of the arguments made implicitly and explicitly by Mahan according to a report. Co. 1918 ) features of the War of 1812, primarily discussing Combat...
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